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Abstract
The BG-simulation is a powerful reduction algorithm designed for asynchronous read/write crash-
prone systems. It allows a set of (t + 1) asynchronous sequential processes to wait-free simulate (i.e.,
despite the crash of up to t of them) an arbitrary number n of processes under the assumption that at most
t of them may crash. The BG simulation shows that, in read/write systems, the crucial parameter is not the
number n of processes, but the upper bound t on the number of process crashes.
The paper extends the concept of BG simulation to asynchronous message-passing systems prone to
Byzantine failures. Byzantine failures are the most general type of failure: a faulty process can exhibit any
arbitrary behavior. Because of this, they are also the most difficult to analyze and to handle algorithmically.
The main contribution of the paper is a signature-free reduction of Byzantine failures to crash failures.
Assuming t < min(n′, n/3), the paper presents an algorithm that simulates a system of n′ processes
where up to t may crash, on top of a basic system of n processes where up to t may be Byzantine. While
topological techniques have been used to relate the computability of Byzantine failure-prone systems to
that of crash failure-prone ones, this simulation is the first, to our knowledge, that establishes this relation
directly, in an algorithmic way.
In addition to extending the basic BG simulation to message-passing systems and failures more severe
than process crashes, being modular and direct, this simulation provides us with a deeper insight in the
nature and understanding of crash and Byzantine failures in the context of asynchronous message-passing
systems. Moreover, it also allows crash-tolerant algorithms, designed for asynchronous read/write sys-
tems, to be executed on top of asynchronous message-passing systems prone to Byzantine failures.
Keywords: Asynchronous processes, BG simulation, Byzantine process, Distributed computability, Fault-
tolerance, Message-passing system, Process crash, Read/write shared memory system, Reduction algo-
rithm, t-Resilience, System model, Wait-freedom.
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1 Introduction
What is the Borowsky-Gafni (BG) simulation and why is it important? Considering an asynchronous
system where processes can crash, the (n, k)-set agreement problem is a basic distributed decision task defined
as follows [11]. Each of the n processes proposes a value, and every process that does not crash has to decide
a value (termination), such that a decided value is a proposed value (validity) and at most k different values
are decided (agreement). The consensus problem corresponds to the particular case k = 1.
The (n, k)-set agreement is fundamental because it captures the essence of fault-tolerant distributed com-
putability issues. A central question related to asynchronous distributed computability is the following: “Can
we use a solution to the (n, k)-set agreement problem as a subroutine to solve the (n′, k′)-set agreement
problem, when at most t < min(n, n′) processes may crash?” (“Is (n′, k′)-set agreement reducible to (n, k)-
set agreement?”.) The BG simulation (initially sketched in [6] and then formalized in a journal version [7],
where, in addition, a formal definition of “reducibility” is given) answers this fundamental question. It states
that the answer is “yes” if k′ ≥ k and “no” if k′ ≤ t < k. As we can see, the answer “yes” does not depend
on the number of processes.
To this end, the algorithm described in [7] allows (t + 1) processes to simulate a large number n′ of
asynchronous processes that communicate through read/write registers, and collectively solve a decision task,
in the presence of at most t crashes. Each of the (t + 1) simulator processes simulates all the n′ processes.
These (t + 1) simulator processes cooperate through underlying objects that allow them to agree on a single
output for each of the non-deterministic statements issued by every simulated process. (These underlying
objects, called safe agreement objects, can be built of top of read/write atomic registers.)
Let BG(RW,C) denote the basic BG simulation algorithm [7] (RW stands for “read/write communication”,
and C stands for “crash failures”). BG(RW,C) is “symmetric” in the sense that each of the n′ processes is
simulated by every simulator, and the (t + 1) simulators are “equal” with respect to each simulated process,
namely, (1) every simulator fairly simulates all the processes, and (2) the crash of a simulator entails the
crash of at most one simulated process. This symmetry allows BG(RW,C) to be suited to colorless tasks (i.e.,
distributed computing problems where the value decided by a process can be decided by any process [17]).
BG(RW,C) has then been extended to colored tasks (i.e., tasks such as renaming [3], where a process cannot
systematically borrow its output from another process). Extended BG simulation is addressed in [14, 22].
Algorithmic pedagogical presentations of the BG simulation can be found in [18, 22]. A topological view
on distributed computability issues in Byzantine asynchronous message-passing systems has been recently
presented in [16, 28]. A pedagogical topology-based presentation of the BG-simulation is given in chapter 7
of [16].
What is learned from the BG simulation The important lesson learned from the BG simulation is that, in
a failure-prone context, what is important is not the number of processes but the maximal number of possible
failures and the actual number of values that are proposed to a decision task. An interesting consequence of
the BG simulation (among several of its applications [7]) is the proof that there is no t-resilient (n, k)-set
agreement algorithm for t ≥ k. This is obtained as follows. As (1) the BG simulation allows reducing the
(k + 1, k)-set agreement problem to the (n, k)-set agreement problem in a system with up to k failures, and
(2) the (k + 1, k)-set agreement problem is known to be impossible in presence of k failures [6, 19, 30], it
follows that there is no k-resilient (n, k)-set agreement algorithm.
Content of the paper: on the BG-simulation side As already indicated, the BG simulation has been
explored in asynchronous systems where processes (1) communicate through atomic read/write registers [25],
and (2) may commit only crash failures. This paper extends it in two directions. The first is the communication
model, namely, it considers that processes cooperate by sending and receiving messages via asynchronous
reliable channels. The second dimension is related to the type of failures; more precisely, it considers two
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types of failures: process crash failures, and the more severe process Byzantine failures. The paper presents
the following contributions.
A first is an algorithm, denoted BG(MP,C), which simulates the execution of a colorless task running in an
asynchronous message-passing system of n′ processes, where up to t may crash, on top of an asynchronous
message-passing system of n processes where up to tmay crash. This simulation requires t < n/2 (which is a
necessary and sufficient condition to simulate read/write registers in asynchronous message-passing systems
of n processes [2]). While the number of simulated processes n′ can be any integer, for the simulation to be
non-trivial we consider that t < n′.
A second contribution is an algorithm, denoted BG(MP,B), which simulates the execution of a colorless
task running in an asynchronous message-passing system of n′ processes, where up to t may crash, on top of
an asynchronous message-passing system of n processes where up to t may be Byzantine [26]. This simu-
lation requires t < n/3 (according to the task which is simulated, additional constraint on t may be needed,
see [16]; see also Section 6). As in the case of BG(MP,C), and for the same reason, we consider that t < n′.
This algorithm has two noteworthy features: it is the first BG simulation algorithm that considers Byzantine
failures, and it allows to run a crash-tolerant algorithm solving a colorless task on top of an asynchronous
system prone to Byzantine failures. Both the algorithms BG(MP,C) and BG(MP,B) are genuine in the sense
they do not rely on the simulation of an underlying shared memory.
While the full-information algorithm presented in [28] can be used to decide when there is a simulation
between two models, the present paper is the first (to our knowledge) that allows the direct execution in
the presence of Byzantine failures of any crash-tolerant algorithm that solves a colorless task. BG(MP,B)
provides an algorithmic approach which complements the topology-based simulation framework of [28], and
may also be of practical interest. It has the interesting property that the simulation of a message only requires
a polynomial number of messages in the base system, and the increase in size of these messages, when
compared to the size of the simulated message, is also polynomial. Additionally, differently from early works
on Byzantine failures like [15], it does not use any cryptography-based mechanism.
Content of the paper: on the safe agreement objects side The core of the previous algorithms lies in
new underlying safe agreement objects, which allow the n simulators to agree on the next operation exe-
cuted by each of the n′ simulated processes. Such a safe agreement object ensures that all the simulators
produce the very same simulation. At the operational level, a safe agreement object provides processes with
two operations, denoted propose() and decide(), which are invoked in this order by each correct process.
The termination property associated with a safe agreement object SA is the following: if no simulator com-
mits a failure while executing SA.propose(), then any invocation of SA.decide() by a non-faulty simulator
terminates. Moreover, no two correct processes decide differently.
On the algorithmic side, a novelty of the paper lies in the algorithms implementing these new safe agree-
ment objects. Differently from their read/write memory counterparts, they are not based on underlying snap-
shot objects [1]. They instead rely heavily on message communication patterns inspired from the reliable
broadcast algorithms introduced in [8].
A last and noteworthy contribution of the paper lies in the second algorithm (which implements safe
agreement in a Byzantine message-passing system). This object is the core of a simulation when one wants to
execute asynchronous read/write crash-tolerant algorithms on top of asynchronous message-passing systems
prone to Byzantine failures.
Existing simulations considering Byzantine failures Simulations of crash failures in a Byzantine system
have been addressed in the context of synchronous systems [5, 29, 31]. The only articles we are aware of
concerning such a simulation in asynchronous systems are [12, 16, 20]. As noticed in [4], [12] considers a
restricted class of round-based deterministic algorithms. The simulation presented in [16] executes a full-
information asynchronous crash-tolerant algorithm in an asynchronous Byzantine failure-prone system. The
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article [20] considers an agent/host model and focuses mainly on reliable broadcast.
Roadmap The paper is composed of 6 sections. Section 2 presents both the crash-prone and the Byzantine
asynchronous message-passing models, and the notion of a task. Section 3 presents the structure of the
simulation algorithms. Section 4 presents the simulation algorithm BG(MP,C), while Section 5 presents the
simulation algorithm BG(MP,B). Finally, Section 6 addresses the computability implications of the Byzantine-
tolerant simulation and its underlying safe agreement object.
2 Computation Models and Tasks
2.1 Computation models
Computing entities The system is made up of a set Π of n sequential processes, denoted p1, p2, ..., pn.
These processes are asynchronous in the sense that each process progresses at its own speed, which can be
arbitrary and remains always unknown to the other processes.
During an execution, processes may deviate from their specification. In that case, the corresponding
processes are said to be faulty. A process that does not deviate from its specification is correct (or non-faulty).
The model parameter t denotes the maximal number of processes that can be faulty in a given execution. Two
failure types are considered below.
Communication model The processes cooperate by sending and receiving messages through bi-directional
channels. The communication network is a complete network, which means that each process pi can directly
send a message to any process pj (including itself). Each channel is reliable (no loss, corruption, or creation
of messages), not necessarily first-in/first-out, and asynchronous (while the transit time of each message is
finite, there is no upper bound on message transit times).
The macro-operation “broadcast TYPE(m)”, where TYPE is a message type and m is its content, is a
shortcut for the following statement: “send TYPE(m) to each process (including itself)”.
The process crash failure model In the crash failure model, a process may prematurely stop its execution.
A process executes correctly its algorithm until it possibly crashes. Once crashed, a process remains crashed
forever. It is assumed that at most t processes may crash. If there is no specific constraint on t, the corre-
sponding model is denoted CAMPn,t[t < n]. When it is assumed that at most t < n/2 processes may crash,
the corresponding model is denoted CAMPn,t[t < n/2].
The Byzantine failure model A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it may crash, fail
to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transi-
tions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send the same messagem to all the processes, can
send a messagem1 to some processes, a different messagem2 to another subset of processes, and no message
at all to the other processes. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the computation.
It is assumed that Byzantine processes cannot control the network, hence, when a process receives a
message, it can unambiguously identify its sender. As previously, t denotes the upper bound on the number
of processes that may commit Byzantine failures. If there is no constraint on t, the corresponding model
is denoted BAMPn,t[t < n]. When it is assumed that at most t < n/3 processes may be faulty, the
corresponding model is denoted BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
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2.2 Decision tasks and algorithms solving a task
Decision tasks The problems we are interested in are called decision tasks (the reader interested in a more
formal presentation of decision tasks can consult the literature, e.g., [7, 19]). In every run, each process
proposes a value and the proposed values define an input vector I , where I[j] is the value proposed by process
pj . Let I denote the set of allowed input vectors. Each process has to decide a value. The decided values
define an output vector O, such that O[j] is the value decided by pj . Let O be the set of the output vectors.
A decision task is a binary relation ∆ from I into O. A task is colorless if, when a value v is proposed
by a process pj (i.e., I[j] = v), then v can be proposed by any number of processes and, when a value v′ is
decided by a process pj (i.e., O[j] = v′), then v′ can be decided by any number of processes. Consensus, and
more generally k-set agreement, are colorless tasks. Otherwise the task is colored. Symmetry breaking and
renaming are colored tasks [3, 10, 21].
Algorithm solving a task An algorithm solves a task in a t-resilient environment if, given any I ∈ I, (1)
each correct process pj decides a value oj , and (2) there is an output vector O such that (I,O) ∈ ∆ where O
is defined as follows. If pj decides oj , then O[j] = oj . If pj does not decide, O[j] is set to any value v′ that
preserves the relation (I,O) ∈ ∆.
Considering a system of n processes, a task is t-resiliently solvable if there is an algorithm that solves
it in the presence of at most t faulty processes. As an example, consensus is not 1-resiliently solvable in
asynchronous crash-prone systems, be the communication medium a set of read/write registers [27], or a
message-passing system [13]. Differently, renaming with 2n − 1 new names is (n − 1)-resiliently solvable
in asynchronous read/write crash-prone systems [9, 19], and is t-resiliently solvable in asynchronous crash-
prone message-passing systems for t < n/2 [3].
3 Structure of the Simulation Algorithms
Aim Let A′ be an algorithm that solves a colorless decision task among n′ processes in the system model
CAMPn′,t[t < n′]. The aim is to design an algorithm that simulates A′ in the system model CAMPn,t[t <
n/2] (resp., BAMPn,t[t < n/3]). As already indicated, the corresponding simulation algorithm is denoted
BG(MP,C) in the first case, and BG(MP,B) in the second case.
Notation A simulated process is denoted pj , where 1 ≤ j ≤ n′. Similarly, a simulator process (“simulator”
in short’) is denoted qi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The set Π denote the set of the simulator indexes, i.e., Π =
{1, ..., n}.
The safe agreement objects, build in the simulation and used by the simulators, are identified with upper
case letters, e.g., SA. The variables local to simulator qj is identified with lower case letters, and the resulting
identifiers are subscripted with j.
Behavior of a simulator qi Each simulator is given the code of all the simulated processes p1, ..., pn′ . It
manages n′ threads, one associated with each simulated process, and executes them in a fair way.
The code of a simulated process pj contains local statements, send statements, and receive statements. It
is assumed that the behavior of a simulated process pj is deterministic in the sense it is entirely defined from
its local input (as defined by the task instance), and the order in which pj receives messages.
The simulation has to ensure that (1) all simulators simulate the same behavior of the set of simulated
processes, and (2) a faulty simulator entails the failure of at most one simulated process. The way this is
realized depends, of course, on the failure model that is considered.
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4 BG(MP,C): BG in the Crash-prone Asynchronous Message-Passing Model
This section presents the algorithm BG(MP,C). As previously indicated, this algorithm simulates, in the model
CAMPn,t[t < n/2], an algorithm A′ solving a task in CAMPn′,t[t < n′]. It is made up of two parts: an
algorithm implementing a safe agreement object, and the simulation itself, which uses several of these objects
to allow the simulators to cooperate.
4.1 Safe agreement object in CAMPn,t[t < n/2]: definition
This object type (or variants of it), briefly sketched in the Introduction, is at the core of both the BG simula-
tion [6, 7, 14, 22], and the liveness guarantees of concurrent objects [23, 24]. It is a one-shot object that solves
consensus in failure-free scenarios, and allows processes to agree with a weak termination guarantee in the
presence of failures.
A safe agreement object provides each simulator qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with two operations denoted propose()
and decide(), that qi can invoke at most once, and in this order; propose() allows qi to propose a value, while
decide() allows it to decide a value. Considering the crash failure model, the properties associated with this
object are the following ones.
• Validity. A decided value is a proposed value.
• Agreement. No two simulators decide distinct values.
• Propose-Termination. An invocation of propose() by a correct simulator terminates.
• Decide-Termination. If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), then any invocation of decide()
by a correct simulator terminates.
It is easy to see that a safe agreement object is a consensus object whose termination condition is failure-
dependent. Algorithms implementing safe agreement objects (or variants of it) can be found in [6, 7, 24].
4.2 Safe agreement object in CAMPn,t[t < n/2]: algorithm
An algorithm implementing a safe agreement object in CAMPn,t[t < n/2] is described in Figure 1.
Local data structures Each simulator qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, manages three local data structures, namely, the arrays
valuesi[1..n], my_viewi[1..n], all_viewsi[1..n], all initialized to [⊥, ...,⊥], where⊥ denotes a default value
that cannot be proposed to the safe agreement object by the simulators.
• The aim of valuesi[x] is to contain, as currently known by qi, the value proposed to the safe agreement
object by the simulator qx.
• The aim of my_viewi[x] is to contain, as known by qi, the value proposed to the safe agreement object
by the simulator qx, as witnessed by strictly more than n2 distinct simulators (i.e., at least a correct
process).
• The aim of all_viewsi[x] is to contain what to qi’s knows about the view seen by qx.
Algorithm: the operation propose() The algorithm implementing the operation propose() invoked by a
simulator qi is described at lines C01-C14 (client side) and lines C20-C22 (server side). This algorithm is
made up of three parts.
First part. A simulator qi first broadcasts the message VALUE (i, vi), where vi is the value it proposes to
the safe agreement object (line C01). Then, it waits until it knows that strictly more than n2 simulators know
its value (line C02). On its “server” side, when qi receives for the first time the message VALUE (x, v), it
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first saves v in valuesi[x]; then it forwards the received message to cope with the (possible) crash of qx (this
witnesses the fact that qi knows the value proposed by px, line C20)1).
operation propose (vi) is
(C01) broadcast VALUE (i, vi);
(C02) wait
(
VALUE (i, vi) received from strictly more than n2 different simulators
)
;
(C03) for each x ∈ [1..n] do broadcast READ (i, x) end for;
(C04) for each x ∈ [1..n] do
(C05) wait
(
READ’ANSWER (i, x,⊥) received from strictly more than n
2
different simulators
(C06) ∨ ∃ w : VALUE (x,w) received from strictly more than n
2
different simulators
)
;
(C07) if (predicate of line C06 satisfied)
(C08) then my_viewi[x]← w
(C09) else my_viewi[x]← ⊥
(C10) end if
(C11) end for;
(C12) broadcast VIEW (i,my_viewi);
(C13) wait
(
VIEW (i,my_viewi) received from strictly more than n2 different simulators
)
;
(C14) return().
operation decide () is
(C15) wait
(∃ a non-empty set σ ⊆ Π:
(C16) ∀ y ∈ σ : [(all_viewsi[y] 6= ⊥) ∧ (∀ z ∈ Π : (all_viewsi[y][z] 6= ⊥)⇒ (z ∈ σ))];
(C17) let min_σi be the set σ of smallest size;
(C18) let res be min({valuesi[y] : y ∈ min_σi});
(C19) return(res).
%—————————————————————————————————————-
when the message VALUE (x, v) is received for the first time:
% “for the first time” is with respect to each pair of values (x, v) %
(C20) valuesi[x]← v; broadcast VALUE (x, v).
when the message READ (j, x) is received for the first time:
(C21) send READ’ANSWER (j, x, valuesi[x]) to qj .
when the message VIEW (x, view) is received for the first time:
(C22) all_viewsi[x]← view; broadcast VIEW (x, view).
Figure 1: Safe agreement object in CAMPn,t[t < n/2] (code for the simulator qi)
Second part. In this part, qi builds a local view of the values proposed by the n simulators. To this
end, it first broadcasts messages READ (i, x), 1 ≤ x ≤ n, to learn the value proposed by each simulator qx
(line C03). On its server side, when qi receives such a message, it broadcasts by return its current knowledge
of the value proposed by qx (line C21).
Then, the simulator qi builds its local view of the values that have been proposed. For each simulator qx,
qi waits until it has received from strictly more than n2 distinct simulators the very same message, namely,
either the message READ’ANSWER (i, x,⊥), or the message VALUE (x,w) (lines C05-C06). In the first case,
qi considers that qx has not yet proposed a value, while in the second case it considers that qx proposed the
value w (let us observe that, while qi can receive both READ’ANSWER (i, x,⊥) and messages VALUE (x,w),
it stops waiting as soon as it received strictly more than n2 of one of them) (lines C07-C10).
Third part. Finally, the simulator qi informs the other simulators on its local viewmy_viewi[1..n]. To this
end, it broadcasts the message VIEW (i,my_viewi). When it has received the corresponding “acknowledg-
ments”, qi returns from its invocation of the operation propose() (line C12-C14). (The behavior of qi when it
1 Let us observe that the lines C01 and C20 implement a reliable broadcast of the message VALUE (i, vi). Similarly, the lines C12
and C22 implement a reliable broadcast of the message VIEW (i,my_viewi). It is easy to see that the cost of such a reliable broadcast
is O(n2) messages.
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receives a message VIEW (x, view) is similar to the one when it receives a message VALUE (x, v). The only
difference is that valuesi[x] is now replaced by all_viewsi[x], line C22.)
Algorithm: the operation decide() The algorithm implementing the operation decide() is described at
lines C15-C19. It consists in a “closure” computation. A simulator qi waits until it knows a non-empty set of
simulators σ such that (a) it knows their views, and (b) this set is closed under the relation “has in its published
view the value of” which means that the processes whose values appear in a view of a process of σ are also in
σ (lines C15-C16).
Let us observe that it is possible that, locally, several sets satisfy this property. If it is the case, qi selects
the smallest of them. Let min_σi be this set of simulators (lines C17). The value that is returned by qi is then
the smallest value among the the values proposed by the simulators in min_σi (lines C18-C19).
4.3 Safe agreement object in CAMPn,t[t < n/2]: proof
This section proves that the algorithm presented in Figure 1 implements a safe agreement object, i.e., any of
its runs in CAMPn,t[t < n/2] satisfies the validity, agreement, and termination properties, which define it.
Lemma 1. An invocation of propose() by a simulator that does not crash during this invocation, terminates.
Proof Let us consider a simulator qi that does not crash during its invocation of propose(). Hence, qi
broadcast the message VALUE (i, vi) at line C01. This message is received by strictly more than n2 correct
simulators, and each of them broadcasts this message when it receives it. It follows that qi cannot block
forever at line C02.
Let us now consider the wait statement at lines C05-C06. There are two cases. Let READ (i, x) be a
message broadcast by the simulator qi at line C03.
• Case 1: No correct simulator ever receives a message VALUE (x,−). In this case, each correct sim-
ulator qy is such that valuesy[x] remains always equal to ⊥. It follows that, when qy receives the
message READ (i, x), it sends back to qi the message READ’ANSWER (i, x,⊥) (line C21). As there
are strictly more than n2 correct simulators, qi eventually receives the message READ’ANSWER (i, x,⊥)
from strictly more than n2 different simulators, and the predicate of line C05 is then satisfied.
• Case 2: At least one correct simulator qy receives a message VALUE (x, v). In this case, qy broadcasts
the message VALUE (x, v) when it receives it (line C20). It follows from the broadcasts issued at this
line that qi eventually receives VALUE (x, v) from strictly more than n2 different simulators. When this
occurs, the predicate of line C06 is satisfied, and qi exits the wait statement.
As this is true for any message READ (i, x) broadcast by the simulator qi at line C03, it follows that qi cannot
remain block forever at lines C05-C06.
Let us finally consider the lines C12-C13. As the message VIEW (i,my_viewi) broadcast by qi at line C12
is received by at least all the correct processes, and each of them broadcast it when it receives it for the first
time, it follows that qi receives the message VIEW (i,my_viewi) from strictly more than n2 distinct processes,
and stops waiting at line C13, which concludes the proof of the lemma. 2Lemma 1
Lemma 2. The value returned by an invocation of propose() is a value that was proposed by a simulator.
Proof Let us observe that (due to its definition) the set min_σ is non-empty, and (due the first predicate of
line C06) the simulator indexes y it contains are such that valuesi[y] 6= ⊥. As, for any of those y, valuesi[y]
is set to a non-⊥ value (only once) at line C20, it follows that qi received a message VALUE (y, vy). Hence,
the values in the variables valuesi[y] are values proposed by the corresponding simulators qy. It follows that
the value computed at line C18 is a value that was proposed by a simulator, which concludes the proof of the
lemma. 2Lemma 2
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Lemma 3. No two invocations of decide() return different values.
Proof Let us first observe that, due to the reliable broadcast of the messages VALUE () (lines C01 and C20)
and VIEW () (lines C12 and C22), and the fact that a simulator broadcast a single message VALUE (), we have:
• (valuesi[x] 6= ⊥) ∧ (valuesj [x] 6= ⊥) ⇒ (valuesi[x] = valuesj [x]).
• (all_viewsi[x] 6= ⊥) ∧ (all_viewj [x] 6= ⊥) ⇒ (all_viewsi[x] = all_viewj [x]).
Let us assume, by contradiction, that two simulators qi and qj decide different values. This means that the
sets min_σi min_σj computed at line C17 by qi and qj , respectively, are different.
Since min_σi and min_σj are different, let us consider z ∈ min_σi \min_σj (if min_σi ( min_σj ,
swap i and j). According to the closure predicate used at line C16, as z /∈ min_σj , we have ∀y ∈
min_σj : all_viewsj [y][z] = ⊥. It follows that any simulator qy such that y ∈ min_σj does not fulfill the
condition of line C07 for x = z. Consequently, qy received at line C05 a message READ’ANSWER(y, z,⊥)
from a set of simulators Qy,r(z) of size strictly greater than n2 . Consequently when qy executed line C03 for
x = z, all the simulators qk of Qy,r(z) verified valuesk[z] = ⊥.
When the simulator qz stops waiting at line C02, it received messages VALUE(z,vz) (where vz is the value
sent by qz at line C01) from a set Qz,w of strictly more than n2 simulators. It follows that Qy,r(z) ∩ Qz,w 6=
∅, consequently there is a simulator qk that sent a message READ’ANSWER(y, z,⊥) to qy and a message
VALUE(z,vz) to qz . Since valuek[z] is never reset to ⊥ after being assigned, the simulator qy necessarily
executed line C03 for x = z strictly before qz stops waiting at line C02. Consequently qy stopped waiting
at line C02 before qz executes line C03 for x = y. It does so after receiving messages VALUE(y,vy) (where
vy is the value sent by qy at line C01) from a set Qy,w of strictly more than n2 simulators qk, and each of
these simulators then verifies valuesk = vy. These simulators do not send READ’ANSWER(z, y,⊥) messages
when they receive the READ(z, y) message sent by qz . Thus, it is impossible that qz receives these messages
from strictly more than n2 processes, it consequently cannot verify the predicate of line C05. It follows that
qz executes line C12 with my_viewz[y] = vy 6= ⊥ and this entails that ∀k ∈ Π : all_viewsk[z] 6= ⊥ ⇒
all_viewsk[z][y] 6= ⊥.
Since z ∈ min_σi, all_viewsi[z] 6= ⊥, all_viewsi[z][y] 6= ⊥. According to the predicate of line C16,
this entails that y ∈ min_σi, and since the previous reasoning holds for any y ∈ min_σj , it shows that
min_σj ⊆ min_σi. It follows that, when qi executes line C17, ∀y ∈ min_σj : all_viewsi[y] 6= ⊥ and,
consequently, ∀y ∈ min_σj : all_viewsi[y] = all_viewsj [y]. It entails that if |min_σj | < |min_σi|, then
min_σj would have been chosen by qi at line C17, which proves that min_σi = min_σj and contradicts the
fact that qi and qj decide differently. 2Lemma 3
Lemma 4. If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), then any invocation of decide() by a correct
simulator terminates.
Proof If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), it follows from Lemma 1 that every simulator qi
that invokes propose() broadcasts a message VALUE (i, vi) at line C01 and a message VIEW (i,my_viewsi)
at line C12.
Assuming no simulator crashes while executing propose(), let P be the set of simulators that invoke
propose(), and suppose that one of them, qi, invoke decide() and never terminates. This can only happen if qi
waits forever for the condition of lines C15-C16 to be fulfilled. Since eventually the messages broadcast by the
simulators of P are all delivered to qi, after some finite time ∀y ∈ P : all_viewsi[y] 6= ⊥. Moreover, since
the views broadcast by the simulators of P are built at line C08 from the messages VALUE (−,−) they receive,
it follows that these views can contain non-⊥ values only for the entries corresponding to the simulators of
P (the simulators that are not in P do not sent messages VALUE(−,−)). Consequently, pi eventually verifies
∀y ∈ P : (all_viewsi[y] 6= ⊥) ∧ ({z ∈ Π : all_viewsi[y][z] 6= ⊥} ⊆ P ). It follows that the property
of lines C15-C16 is eventually true for σ = P , which contradicts the fact that qi never terminates its decide()
operation. 2Lemma 4
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Theorem 1. The algorithm in Figure 1 implements a safe agreement object in CAMPn,t[t < n/2].
Proof The proof follows from Lemma 1 (Propose-Termination), Lemma 2 (Validity), Lemma 3 (Agreement),
and Lemma 4 (Decide-Termination). 2Theorem 1
4.4 Simulation algorithm
The simulation algorithm takes as input a distributed algorithm A solving a (colorless) task in the system
model CAMPn′,t[t < n′], and simulates it in CAMPn,t[t < n/2]. Each simulator qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is given a
copy of the n′ processes of A, and a private input vector inputi[1..n′], with one input per simulated processes
pj .
The simulation consists in a fair simulation by each of the n simulators qi of the n′ simulated processes pj .
To that end, each simulator manages n′ threads (each simulating a process pj), and the n threads associated
with the simulation of a process pj cooperate through safe agreement objects.
Objects shared by the simulators To produce a consistent simulation, for each simulated process pj , the
n simulators have to agree on the same sequence of the messages received by pj . To that end, they use an
array of safe agreement objects, denoted SA[1..n′,−], such that SA[j, sn] allows them to agree on the sn-th
message received by the n′ threads simulating pj at each simulator qi.
Objects managed by each simulator qi Each simulator manages the following data structures, with respect
to each simulated process pj .
• inputi[j] contains the input of the simulated process pj , proposed by the simulator qi. (Simulators are
allowed to propose different input vectors for the simulated processes).
• sni[j] is the sequence number (from the simulation point of view) of the next message received by the
simulated process pj .
• senti[j] is a sequence containing messages sent by the simulated processes to the simulated process
pj . It is assumed that the n′ threads of qi access senti[j] in mutual exclusion (when they add messages
to or withdraw messages from this sequence). The symbol ⊕ is used to add messages at the end of a
sequence. Sometimes senti[j] is used as a set.
• receivedi[j] is a set containing the messages received by the simulated process pj (init. ∅).
• statei[j] contains the current local state of the simulated process pj . inputi[j] is a part of statei[j].
It is assumed that the behavior of each simulated process pj is described by a deterministic transition
function δj(), such that δj(statei[j],msg) (a) simulates pj until its next message reception, and (b)
returns a pair. This pair is made up of the new local state of pj plus an array msgs[1..n′] where
msgs[x] contains messages sent by pj to the simulated process px.
In addition to the previous local data, each simulator qi uses a starvation-free mutual exclusion lock,
whose operations are denoted mutex_ini() and mutex_outi(). This lock is used to ensure that, at any time,
at most one of the n′ threads of qi access a safe agreement object. This is to guarantee that the crash of a
simulator qi entails the crash of at most one simulated process pj (line 09). More precisely, if qi crashes while
executing SA[j, sn].propose.(), it can block forever only the invocations of SA[j, sn].decide.(), issued by the
other simulators, thereby preventing the simulation of pj from terminating.
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(01) mutex_ini();SA[j, 0].propose.(inputi[j]);mutex_outi();
(02) inputi[j]← SA[j, 0].decide();
(03) 〈statei[j],msgs[1..n′]〉 ← δj(statei[j], ∅);
(04) for each x ∈ {1, ..., n′} do senti[x]← senti[x] ⊕ msgs[x] end for;
(05) sni[j]← 0;
(06) repeat forever
(07) sni[j]← sni[j] + 1;
(08) wait
(
(senti[j] \ receivedi[j]) 6= ∅
)
;
(09) msg ← oldest message in senti[j] \ receivedi[j];
(10) mutex_ini(); SA[j, sni[j]].propose.(msg); mutex_outi();
(11) rec_msg ← SA[j, sni[j]].decide();
(12) receivedi[j]← receivedi[j] ∪ {rec_msg};
(13) 〈statei[j],msgs[1..n′]〉 ← δj(statei[j], rec_msg);
(14) for each x ∈ {1, ..., n′} do senti[x]← senti[x] ⊕ msgs[x] end for;
(15) if (no value yet decided by pj ∧ statei[j] allows pj to decide a value v)
(16) then the simulated process pj decides v
(17) end if
(18) end repeat.
Figure 2: Thread of the simulator qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, simulating the process pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n′
The simulation algorithm The algorithm describing the simulation of a process pj by the associated thread
of the simulator qi is presented in Figure 2.
The simulators have first to agree on the same input for process pj . To this end, they use the safe agreement
object SA[j, 0] (lines 01-02). Moreover, when considering all the simulated processes, it follows from the
mutual exclusion lock that, whatever the number of simulated processes, a simulator qi is engaged in at most
one invocation of propose() at a time. Then, according to the decided input of pj , qi locally simulate pj until
it invokes a message reception (lines 03-04).
After this initialization, each simulator qi enters a loop whose aim is to locally simulate pj . To this end, qi
first determines the message that pj will receive; this message is saved in rec_msg and added to receivedi[j]
(lines 07-12). When this message has been determined, qi simulates the behavior of pj until its next message
reception (lines 13-14). Finally, if statei[j] allows pj to decide a value with respect to the simulated decision
task, this value is decided (lines 15-17).
4.5 Proof of the simulation
The reader interested in a formal definition of the term simulation –as used here– will consult [7].
Lemma 5. The crash of a simulator qi entails the crash of at most one simulated process pj .
Proof The only places where a simulator qi can block is during the invocation of the safe agreement operation
decide(). Such invocations appear at line 02, and line 11. It follows from the termination property of the safe
agreement objects that such an invocation can block forever the invoking process only if a simulator crashes
during the invocation of the operation propose() on the same object. But, due to the mutual exclusion lock
used at line 01 and line 10, a simulator can be engaged in at most one invocation of propose at a time. It
follows that the crash of a simulation qi can entail the definitive halting (crash) of at most one simulated
process pj . 2Lemma 5
Lemma 6. The simulation of the reception of the k-th message received by a simulated process pj , returns
the same message at all simulators.
Proof The simulation of the message receptions for a simulated process pj , are executed at each simulator qi
at lines 08-11, and all the simulators use the same sequence of sequence numbers (line 07). It then follows
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from the agreement property of the safe agreement object SA[j, sn], that no two simulators obtain different
messages when they invoke SA[j, sn].decide(), and the lemma follows. 2Lemma 6
Lemma 7. For every simulated processes pj , no two simulators return different values.
Proof The only non-deterministic elements of the simulation are the input vectors inputi[1..n′] at each
simulator qi, and the reception of the simulated messages.
The lines 01-02 of the simulation force the simulators to agree on the same input value for each simulated
process pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n′. Similarly, as shown by Lemma 6, for each simulated process pj , the lines 07-11
direct the simulators to agree on the very same sequence of messages received by pj . It follows from the fact
that the function δj() is deterministic, that any two simulators qi and qk, that execute lines 15-16 during the
same “round number” sni[j] = snk[j], are such that statei[j] = statek[j], from which the lemma follows.
2Lemma 7
Lemma 8. The sequences of message receptions simulated by each simulator qi on behalf of each simulated
process pj , define a correct execution of the simulated algorithm.
Proof To prove the correctness of the simulation, we have to show that
1. Every message that was sent by a simulated process to another simulated process (whose simulation is
not blocked either), is received, and
2. The simulated messages respect a simulated physical order (i.e., no message is “received” before being
“sent”).
Item 1 is satisfied because the messages sent by the simulated process pj to the simulated process pk are
received (lines 09-11) in their sending order (as defined at line 04 and line 14). Hence, if pk is not blocked
(due to the crash of a simulator) it obtains the messages from pj in their sending order.
For Item 2, let us define a (simulated) physical order as follows. For each simulated message m, let us
consider the first time at which the reception of m was simulated (i.e., this occurs when –for the first time– a
simulator terminates the invocation of SA[−,−].decide() that returns m). A message that is decided has been
proposed by a simulator to a safe agreement object before being decided (validity property).The sending time
of a simulated message is defined as the first time at which SA[−,−].propose(m) is invoked by a simulator.
It follows that any simulated message is sent before being received, which concludes the lemma. 2Lemma 8
Lemma 9. Each correct simulator qi computes the decision value of at least (n′ − t) simulated processes.
Proof Due to Lemma 5, and the fact that at most t simulators may crash, it follows that at most t simulated
processes may be prevented from progressing. As (a) by assumption the simulated algorithm A′ is t-resilient,
and (b) due to Lemma 8 the simulation produces a correct simulation of A′, it follows that at least (n′ − t)
simulated processes decide a value. 2Lemma 9
Theorem 2. Let A be an algorithm solving a decision task in CAMPn′,t[t < n′]. The algorithm described
in Figure 2 is a correct simulation of A in CAMPn,t[t < n/2].
Proof The theorem follows from Lemma 8 and Lemma 9. 2Theorem 2
5 BG(MP,B): BG in the Byzantine Asynchronous Message-Passing Model
This section presents an algorithm, denoted BG(MP,B), which implements the BG simulation in the Byzantine
asynchronous message-passing model BAMPn,t[t < n/3]. To this end, an appropriate safe agreement object
is first built, and then used by the simulation algorithm.
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5.1 From crash failures to Byzantine behaviors
The idea is to extend the algorithm of Figure 1 to obtain an algorithm that copes with Byzantine simulators.
The main issues that have to be solved are the following.
• The simulators need a mechanism to control the validity of the inputs to the safe agreement objects.
(See below for the notion of a valid value.)
• The simulators must be able to check if a given simulator qi is participating in more than one operation
propose() at the same time (on the same or several safe agreement objects). If it is the case, qi is faulty
and its definitive stop can block forever several simulated processes. Hence, such a faulty simulator has
to be ignored.
To solve these issues, each safe agreement object may no longer be considered as a separate abstraction: each
new instance depends on the previous ones. This is captured in the following specification customized to the
Byzantine model, and, at the operational level, in the predicate valid() used in the algorithm implementing the
operation propose().
5.2 Safe agreement in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]: definition
To cope with the previous observations, the fact that a faulty process may decide an arbitrary value, and
the fact that the safe agreement objects are used to solve specific problems (a simulation in our case), the
specification of the safe agreement object is reshaped as follows.
A value proposed by a process to a safe agreement object must be valid. At each correct simulator qi, the
validity of a value is captured by a predicate denoted validi(j, v) where v is the value and qj the simulator that
proposed it. This predicate is made up of two parts (defined in Section 5.3 and Section 5.6, respectively). If
qj is correct, the predicate validi(j, v) eventually returns true at pi. If qj is faulty, validi(j, v) returns true at
pi only if (a) the value v could have been proposed by a correct simulator and (b) to qi’s knowledge, qj does
not participate concurrently in several invocations of propose().
• Validity. If a correct simulator qi decides the value v, there is a correct simulator qj such that validj(−, v).
(v was validated by a correct simulator.)
• Agreement. No two correct simulators decide distinct values.
• Propose-Termination. Any invocation of propose() by a correct simulator terminates.
• Decide-Termination. The invocations by all the correct simulators of decide() on all the safe agreement
objects terminate, except for at most t safe agreement objects.
5.3 Safe agreement in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]: algorithm
The local variables valuesi[1..n], my_viewi[1..n], all_viewsi[1..n], and the algorithm implementing the op-
eration decide() are the same as in Figure 1 (lines C15-C19). The new algorithm implementing the operation
propose(), and the processing of the associated messages, are described in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
This implementation uses an additional local array answersi[1..n][1..n][1..n], all entries of which are
initialized to “?”. The meaning of “answersi[k][j][x] = v” (where v is a proposed value or ⊥) is the
following: to the knowledge of qi, the simulator qk answered value v when it received the message READ(j, x)
sent by qj . (A simulator qj broadcasts such a message when it needs to know the value proposed by the
simulator qx; ⊥ means that qk does not know this value yet.) This means that, from qi’s point of view, the
value proposed by qx, as known by qk when it received the request by qj , is v.
Lemma 10. Any two sets of simulators Q1 and Q2 of more than n+t2 elements have at least one correct
simulator in their intersection.
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Proof As we consider integers, “strictly more than n+t2 ” is equivalent to “at least bn+t2 c+ 1”.
• Q1 ∪Q2 ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn}. Hence, |Q1 ∪Q2| ≤ n.
• |Q1 ∩ Q2| = |Q1| + |Q2| − |Q1 ∪ Q2| ≥ |Q1| + |Q2| − n ≥ 2(bn+t2 c + 1) − n > 2(n+t2 ) − n = t.
Hence, |Q1 ∩Q2| ≥ t+ 1. It follows that Q1 ∩Q2 contains at least one correct simulator.
2Lemma 10
The fact that, despite Byzantine processes, the intersection of any two simulator sets of size greater than
n+t
2 have at least one correct simulator in common, is used in many places in the algorithm. This property
will be used in the proof to show that the local views of the correct processes are mutually consistent.
The operation propose() The client side of the algorithm implementing the operation propose() is de-
scribed in Figure 3; its server side is described in Figure 4. The client side algorithm is very close to the one
of the crash failure case (Figure 1). They differ in two points.
• The message tags VALUE and VIEW (used at lines C02, C06, and C13 in Figure 1) are replaced in
Figure 3 by the tags VALUE’ACK and VIEW’ACK, respectively. The role of these message tags is
explained below.
• The predicate of line B05 is replaced by the predicate |{k : answersi[k][i][x] = ⊥}| > n+t2 . This
predicate states that more than n+t2 simulators answered⊥ to the request message READ(i, x) broadcast
by qi, (i.e., they did not know the value proposed by qx when they received the read request).
operation propose (vi) is
(B01) broadcast VALUE (i, vi);
(B02) wait
(
VALUE’ACK (i, vi) received from > n+t2 different simulators
)
;
(B03) for each x ∈ [1..n] do broadcast READ (i, x) end for;
(B04) for each x ∈ [1..n] do
(B05) wait
(
(|{k : answersi[k][i][x] = ⊥}| > n+t2 ) ∨
(B06) ( ∃ w : VALUE’ACK (x,w) received from > n+t
2
different simulators)
)
;
(B07) if (predicate of line B06 satisfied)
(B08) then my_viewi[x]← w
(B09) else my_viewi[x]← ⊥
(B10) end if
(B11) end for;
(B12) broadcast VIEW (i,my_viewi);
(B13) wait
(
VIEW’ACK (i,my_viewi) received from > n+t2 different simulators
)
;
(B14) return().
operation decide () is
(C15) wait
(∃ a non-empty set σ ⊆ Π:
(C16) ∀ y ∈ σ : [(all_viewsi[y] 6= ⊥) ∧ (∀ z ∈ Π : (all_viewsi[y][z] 6= ⊥)⇒ (z ∈ σ))];
(C17) let min_σi be the set σ of smallest size;
(C18) let res be min({valuesi[y] : y ∈ min_σi});
(C19) return(res).
Figure 3: Safe agreement object in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]: operation propose() of simulator qi
Messages VALUE(), VALUE’VALID(), VALUE’WITNESS() and VALUE’ACK() When a simulator qi invokes
the operation propose(vi), it first broadcasts the message VALUE (i, vi), and waits for n+t2 acknowledgments
(messages VALUE’ACK(i, vi), lines B01-B02). Then, as in the crash failure case (Figure 1), it builds its local
view of the values proposed to the safe agreement object (lines B03-B11). Finally, it sends its local view to
all other simulators (lines B12-B13).
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when the message VALUE (j, v) is received from qj for the first time:
(B15) wait
(
validi (j, v)
)
; broadcast VALUE’VALID (j, v).
when the message VALUE’VALID (j, v) is received:
(B16) if
(
(VALUE’VALID (j, v) received from > n+t
2
different simulators) ∧ (VALUE’WITNESS (j,−) never broadcast))
(B17) then broadcast VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) end if.
when the message VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) is received:
(B18) if
(
(VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) received from t+ 1 different simulators) ∧ (VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) never broadcast))
(B19) then broadcast VALUE’WITNESS (j, v)
(B20) end if;
(B21) if (VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) received from > n+t
2
different simulators)
(B22) then valuesi[j]← v; broadcast VALUE’ACK (j, v)
(B23) end if.
————————————————————————————————————————————————–
when the message READ (j, x) is received from qj for the first time:
(B24) wait
(
VALUE’ACK (j, v) received from > n+t
2
different simulators
)
;
(B25) valuesi[j]← v; broadcast VALUE’ACK (j, v);
(B26) broadcast READ’ANSWER (j, x, valuesi[x]).
when the message READ’ANSWER (j, x, v) is received from qk for the first time:
(B27) if (READ’ANSWER’WITNESS (k, j, x,−) never broadcast) then broadcast READ’ANSWER’WITNESS (k, j, x, v) end if.
when the message READ’ANSWER’WITNESS (k, j, x, v) is received:
(B28) if
(
(READ’ANSWER’WITNESS (k, j, x, v) received from t+ 1 different simulators)
(B29) ∧ (READ’ANSWER’WITNESS (k, j, x, v) never broadcast))
(B30) then broadcast READ’ANSWER’WITNESS (k, j, x, v)
(B31) end if;
(B32) if (READ’ANSWER’WITNESS (k, j, x, v) received from > n+t
2
different simulators)
(B33) then answersi[k][j][x]← v
(B34) end if.
————————————————————————————————————————————————–
when the message VIEW (j, view) is received from qj for the first time:
(B35) if
(
(VIEW’WITNESS (j,−) never broadcast) ∧ (view[j] 6= ⊥))
(B36) then for x ∈ [1..n] do
(B37) if (view[x] 6= ⊥)
(B38) then wait
(
VALUE’ACK (x, view[x]) received from > n+t
2
different simulators
)
(B39) else wait
(|{k : answersi[k][j][x] = ⊥}| > n+t2 )
(B40) end if
(B41) end for;
(B42) broadcast VIEW’WITNESS (j, view)
(B43) end if.
when the message VIEW’WITNESS (j, view) is received:
(B44) if
(
(VIEW’WITNESS (j, view) received from t+ 1 different simulators) ∧ (VIEW’WITNESS (j, view) never broadcast))
(B45) then broadcast VIEW’WITNESS (j, view)
(B46) end if;
(B47) if (VIEW’WITNESS (j, view) received from > n+t
2
different simulators)
(B48) then all_viewsi[j]← view; send VIEW’ACK (j, view) to qj
(B49) end if.
Figure 4: Safe agreement object in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]: server side of simulator qi
On its server side, when a simulator qi receives a message VALUE (j, v), it first checks if this message is
valid (line B15). If the message is valid, qi broadcasts (echoes) the message VALUE’VALID (j, v) to inform
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the other simulators that it agrees to take into account the pair (j, v) (line B15).
When the simulator pi has received the message VALUE’VALID (j, v) from more than n+t2 simulators, it
broadcasts the message VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) to inform the other processes that at least n+t2 − t = n−t2 ≥
t+ 1 correct simulators, have validated the pair (j, v).
When qi has received the message VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) from (t+ 1) simulators (i.e., from at least one
correct simulator) it broadcasts this message, if not yet done (lines B18-B20). This is to prevent invocations
of propose() from blocking forever (while waiting VALUE’ACK (j, v) messages at line B02, B06, B24 or
B38), because not enough VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) messages have been broadcast2. Then, if qi has received
the message VALUE’WITNESS (j, v) from more than n+t2 simulators, it takes v into account (writes it into
valuesi[j]) and sends an acknowledgment to qj (lines B21-B23). The corresponding message VALUE’ACK
(j, v) broadcast by qi will also inform the other simulators that qi took into account the value v proposed by
qj . Hence, this message will help qj progress at line B02, and all correct simulators progress at line B06.
First part of the predicate validi(j, v) As already indicated, the aim of this predicate is to help a simulator
qi detect if the value v proposed by the simulator qj is valid. It is always satisfied when qj is correct, and it
can return true or f alse when qj is faulty. It is made up of two sub-predicates P1 and P2.
• The first sub-predicate P1 checks if, for the messages VALUE (j,−) (from qj) and VALUE’VALID (j,−)
(from more than t+ 1 different simulators) that qi has received for other safe agreement objects, qi has
also received the associated messages VIEW’WITNESS (j,−) from at least (n− t) different simulators.
This allows qi to check if the simulator qj is not simultaneously participating in other invocations of
propose() on other safe agreement objects.
• The aim of the second sub-predicate P2 (defined in Section 5.6 and used in the simulation) is to allow
the simulators to check that the simulation is consistent. As the present section considers safe agreement
objects independently from its use in the simulation, we consider, for now, that P2 is always satisfied.
If the full predicate validi(j, v) is never satisfied, qi will, collectively with the other correct simulators, prevent
the faulty simulator qj from progressing with respect to the corresponding safe agreement object.
Messages READ(), READ’ANSWER() and READ’ANSWER’WITNESS() After the value vi it proposes to the
safe agreement object has been taken into account by n+t2 simulators, qi builds a local view of all the values
proposed (array my_viewi [1..n]). To this end, as in the crash failure model, qi sends to each simulator qx the
customized message READ (i, x) (line B03). Its behavior is then similar to the one of the crash failure model
(line B04-B11), where the new predicate |{k : answersi[k][i][x] = ⊥}| > n+t2 is now used at line B05.
When qi receives the message READ (j, x) from the simulator qj , it first waits until it knows that the
value proposed by qj is known by more than n+t2 simulators (line B24). This is to check that qj broadcast
its proposed value before reading the other simulator values used to build its own view. When this occurs, qi
answers the message READ (j, x) by broadcasting the message READ’ANSWSER (j, x, valuesi[x]) to inform
all the simulators on what it currently knows on the value proposed by qx (line B26). (Let us remind that, in
the crash failure model, qi was sending this message only to qj .)
When it receives the message READ’ANSWER (j, x, v) from a simulator qk, if not yet done, qi broadcasts
the message READ’ANSWSER’WITNESS (k, j, x, v). The lines B27-B31 implement a reliable broadcast [8],
i.e., the message READ’ANSWSER’WITNESS (k, j, x, v) is received by all correct processes or none of them,
and is always received if the sender is correct. The reliable reception of this message entails the assignment
of answeri[k, j, x] to v (line B33).
2A similar mechanism is used in [8] to ensure that the proposed reliable broadcast abstraction guarantees that a message is received
by all or none of the correct processes.
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Messages VIEW(), VIEW’WITNESS() and VIEW’ACK() Finally, as in Figure 1, the simulator qi broadcasts
its local view of proposed values to all simulators, waits until more than n+t2 of them sent back an acknowl-
edgment, and returns from the invocation of propose() (lines B12-B14).
When qi receives for the first time the message VIEW (j, view), it realizes an enriched reliable broadcast
whose aim is to assign view to all_viewi[j]. Let us first observe that if view[j] = ⊥, then qj is Byzantine. If it
has not yet broadcast VIEW’WITNESS (j, view) and if view[j] 6= ⊥ (line B35), qi first checks if all the values
in view[1..n] are consistent. From its point of view, this means that, for each simulator qx, (a) if view[x] = v,
it must receive messages VALUE’ACK (x, v) from more than n+t2 simulators, and (b) if view[x] = ⊥, the
same predicate as in line B05 must become satisfied. This consistency check is realized by the lines B36-B41.
Finally, when qi receives a message VIEW’WITNESS (j, view), it does the following. First, if it has
received this message from at least one correct simulator, and has not yet broadcast it, qi does it (lines B44-
B46). This part of the reliable broadcast is to prevent the correct simulators from blocking forever. Then, if
it has received VIEW’WITNESS (j, view) from more than n+t2 simulators and has not yet assigned a value to
all_viewi[j], qi does it and sends to qj the acknowledgment message VIEW’ACK (j, view) to inform qj that
it knows its view (lines B47-B49).
5.4 A communication pattern
When considering the algorithm of Figure 4, it appears that the processing of the messages VALUE’WITNESS ()
(lines B18-B23), READ’ANSWER’WITNESS () (lines B28-B34), and VIEW’WITNESS () (lines B44-B49), fol-
low the same generic pattern. This pattern, inspired from [8] and where WITNESS is used as message tag, is
described in Figure 5.
when WITNESS (m) is received:
(GP01) if
(
WITNESS (m) received from t+ 1 different simulators
(GP02) ∧ WITNESS (m) never broadcast)
(GP03) then broadcast WITNESS (m)
(GP04) end if;
(GP05) if (WITNESS (m) received from > n+t
2
different simulators)
(GP06) then execute statement A
(GP07) end if.
Figure 5: Generic communication pattern in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]
Theorem 3. (i) If a correct simulator executes action A, all correct simulators do it.
(ii) If (t+ 1) correct simulators execute broadcast WITNESS(m), all correct simulators execute action A.
Proof Proof of (i). Let pi be a correct process that executes A. It follows from line GP05 that it has received
the message WITNESS (m) from more than n+t2 different simulators. As n > 3t, bn+t2 c + 1 ≥ 2t + 1, pi
received the message WITNESS (m) from at least (t+ 1) correct simulators. It then follows from lines GP01-
GP02 that all correct simulators broadcast WITNESS (m) and, consequently, each correct simulator receives
WITNESS (m) from at least (n− t) simulators. The proof follows from n− t > n+t2 .
Proof of (ii). If (t+1) correct simulators broadcast WITNESS (m), the predicate of line GP01 is eventually
satisfied at every correct simulator. As As n− t > n+t2 , it follows that the predicate of line GP05 will also be
satisfied at each correct simulator, which concludes the proof. 2Theorem 3
5.5 Safe agreement object in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]: proof
This section proves that the algorithm presented in Figures 3 and 4 implements a safe agreement object in the
presence of Byzantine simulators, i.e., any of its runs in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] satisfies the validity, agreement,
and termination properties that define this object.
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Propose-termination
Lemma 11. Let qi be a correct simulator. If the predicate validj(i, vi) eventually becomes satisfied at the
correct simulators qj , then the invocation of propose(vi) by qi terminates.
Proof A correct simulator qi can be blocked forever in a wait statement (1) at line B02, (2) at lines B05-B06,
or (3) at line B13. We show that, if the predicate validj(i, vi) is eventually satisfied at the correct simulators
qj , pi cannot block forever in the invocation of propose(vi).
• wait instruction at line B02.
Simulator qi first broadcasts the message VALUE(i, vi) (line B01), then waits for VALUE’ACK messages
from more than n+t2 different simulators. When a correct simulator qj receives VALUE(i, vi) for the
first time, it waits until validj(i, vi) becomes satisfied. By assumption, this happens. Simulator qj then
broadcasts VALUE’VALID(i, vi). It follows that each of the at least (n− t) correct simulators broadcasts
the message VALUE’VALID(i, vi).
As n − t > n+t2 , it follows that each correct simulator qj receives the message VALUE’VALID(i, vi)
from more than n+t2 simulators and broadcasts the message VALUE’WITNESS(i, vi).
According to Theorem 3, qj updates valuesj [i] with vi, and broadcasts VALUE’ACK(i, vi) (lines B21-
B23). The correct simulator qi will then receive the message VALUE’ACK(i, vi) from at least n − t >
n+t
2 simulators. Hence, it cannot block forever at line B02.
• wait instruction at lines B05-B06.
In this waiting statement, qi waits until either |{k : answersi[k][i][j] = ⊥}| > n+t2 becomes true, or
until it receives VALUE’ACK(j, w) from more than n+t2 different simulators.
– If qj is a correct simulator that invoked propose(j, w), the reasoning is the same as above. Conse-
quently, qi will receive VALUE’ACK(j, w) from at least n− t > n+t2 different simulators.
– If qj is faulty or never invokes propose(j, w), qi may never receive VALUE’ACK(j, w) from more
than n+t2 different simulators. We will show that, in this case, the wait predicate |{k : answersi[k][i][j] =
⊥}| > n+t2 eventually becomes true.
We first show that, if a correct simulator receives VALUE’ACK(j, w) from more than n+t2 different
simulators, then all correct simulators do receive VALUE’ACK(j, w) from more than n+t2 different sim-
ulators. If a correct simulator receives VALUE’ACK(j, w) from more than n+t2 different simulators, at
least (t + 1) correct simulators broadcast it. Every correct simulator will then receive the message
VALUE’ACK(j, w) from at least (t + 1) different simulators and, if not already done, broadcasts it
(lines B24-B25). All correct simulators will then receive the message VALUE’ACK(j, w) from at least
n− t > n+t2 different simulators.
According to the previous observation, let us consider the case in which no correct simulator ever re-
ceives the message VALUE’ACK(j, w) from more than n+t2 different simulators. A correct simulator qk
assigns a non-⊥ value to valuesk[j] only if it receives VALUE’WITNESS(j, w) from more than n+t2
different simulators (line B22), or if it receives VALUE’ACK(j, w) from more than n+t2 different simu-
lators (line B25). If a correct simulator receives VALUE’WITNESS(j, w) from more than n+t2 different
simulators, according to Theorem 3, all correct simulators receive VALUE’WITNESS(j, w) from more
than n+t2 different simulators, and broadcast the message VALUE’ACK(j, w). Because no correct sim-
ulator ever receives VALUE’ACK(j, vj) messages from more than n+t2 different simulators, no correct
simulator qk will ever assign a non-⊥ value to valuesk[j] (line B22).
When a correct simulator receives a READ(i, j) message from qi, it waits until it has received VALUE’ACK(i, vi)
messages from more than n+t2 different simulators (line B24). The reasoning above (first item) shows
that this will eventually become true.
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Every correct simulator qk will then broadcast READ’ANSWER(i, j,⊥). This will cause all correct
simulators to broadcast mess sages READ’ANSWER’WITNESS(k, i, j,⊥), which will be received by the
simulator qi. This will then assign ⊥ to answersi[k][i][j] for at least n − t > n+t2 different values of
k. Consequently, it will not remain blocked at lines B05-B06.
• wait instruction at line B13.
As simulator qi broadcasts its view with a message VIEW(i, view) (line B12), every correct simulator
checks if this view is consistent when it receives it (lines B36-B41). Let us first consider the entries
view[j] such that view[j] = w 6= ⊥. This means that qi has received VALUE’ACK(j, w) from more
than n+t2 different simulators. All the correct simulators then receive the same message from a sufficient
number of different simulators and do not remain blocked at line B38 (Theorem 3).
Let us now consider the entries view[j] such that view[j] = ⊥. Simulator qi assigned ⊥ to view[j] be-
cause it received READ’ANSWER’WITNESS(k, i, j,⊥) from more than n+t2 different simulators (lines B32-
33). According to Theorem 3, all the correct simulators qx will also receive READ’ANSWER’WITNESS(k, i, j,⊥)
from more than n+t2 different simulators, and will assign ⊥ to answersx[k][i][j]. They will thus not
remain blocked at line B39.
All the correct simulators will then broadcast the message VIEW’WITNESS(i, view) (line B42). By
Theorem 3, they will all send VIEW’ACK(i, view) to qi. This will allow qi to terminate its invocation
of propose(i, vi), which concludes the proof of the lemma.
2Lemma 11
Lemma 12. Let v1, . . . , vx, . . . be the values proposed by a correct simulator qi to a sequence of safe agree-
ment objects. If qi does not invoke propose() operations concurrently and validj(i, vx) is eventually satisfied
at every correct simulator qj , then validj(i, vx+1) is also eventually satisfied at qj .
Proof We consider here that the sub-predicate P2 is always satisfied, and thus consider only the sub-predicate
P1. Let us recall that P1 states that, for every message VALUE(i,−) that qj received from qi, and for every
message VALUE’VALID(i,−) that qj received from at least t+ 1 different simulators, it has also received the
corresponding messages VIEW’WITNESS(i,−).
By hypothesis, validj(i, vx) is eventually satisfied at the correct simulator qj . Once qi broadcasts the
message VALUE(i, vx), qj only needs to receive the corresponding VIEW’WITNESS(i, view) for P1 to be sat-
isfied. By Lemma 11, qi terminates its invocation of propose(i, vx), from which we conclude that it received
VIEW’ACK(i, view) from more than n+t2 different simulators (line B13). A correct simulator sends such a
message only if it has received VIEW’WITNESS(i, view) from more than n+t2 different simulators (lines B47-
B48). According to Theorem 3, all the correct simulators also broadcast it (lines B44-B45). The correct
simulator qj then receives them from more than n+t2 different simulators. The predicate validj(i, vx+1) is
then eventually satisfied at qj . 2Lemma 12
Decide-termination
Lemma 13. If a correct simulator terminates its invocation of decide(), then all correct simulators terminate
their invocation of decide().
Proof Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the invocation of decide() by a correct simulator qi terminates,
and that the invocation of decide() by another correct simulator qj does not.
The invocation of decide() by qi can terminate only if the predicate at lines C15-C16 is satisfied. Let qk be
any simulator in the set σ defined at line C15. We show that all_viewsi[k] = view implies that we eventually
have all_viewsj [k] = view, and thus that qj must decide.
Simulator qi assigns view to all_viewsi[k] at line B48. This can happen only because qi received
VIEW’WITNESS(k, view) messages from more than n+t2 different simulators. According to Theorem 3, qj
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eventually receives enough VIEW’WITNESS(k, view) messages and also assigns view to all_viewsj [k]. Sim-
ulator qj will then also have to decide. 2Lemma 13
Lemma 14. The invocations of decide() by all the correct simulators on all the safe agreement objects termi-
nate, except for at most t safe agreement objects.
Proof Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there are t + 1 safe agreement objects such that at least one
correct simulator never terminates its invocation of decide(). By Lemma 13, there must be (t + 1) different
safe agreement objects in which no correct simulator terminates its invocations of decide().
The invocation of the decide() operation by a correct simulator qi on a safe agreement object can only
be blocked at lines C15-C16, if the corresponding predicate is never satisfied. This can happen if (1) there is
no simulator qj such that all_viewsi[j] 6= ⊥ or, (2) for every non-empty set of simulators σ, there are two
simulators qy ∈ σ and qz such that all_viewsi[y][z] 6= ⊥ ∧ all_viewsi[z] = ⊥. Because a correct simulator
qi invokes propose() before invoking decide(), case (1) cannot happen; we always have all_viewsi[i] 6= ⊥.
We then consider case (2).
Case (2) can happen if qz starts an invocation of propose() and communicates its proposed value to other
processes, but does not terminate its invocation by communicating its view. Because there are at most t faulty
simulators, by the pigeonhole principle, there must be a faulty simulator qz that prevents qi from deciding on
two different safe agreement objects.
A correct simulator qk broadcasts a VALUE’VALID(z,−) after receiving a VALUE(z,−) message only if
the predicate validk(z,−) is satisfied (line B15). Due to the predicate validk(z,−), this is true only if qk
received VIEW’WITNESS(z,−) messages from at least (n − t) different simulators, each of these messages
corresponding to the all the VALUE(z,−) and VALUE’VALID(z,−) messages that it has previously received
(see the definition of the predicate P1 of validk(z,−)).
Let propose(v1) be the invocation of propose() by qz on the first safe agreement object on which qi is
blocked, and propose(v2) the one on the second safe agreement object on which qi is blocked. Because
there is a simulator qy ∈ σ such that all_viewsi[y] 6= ⊥ in the two invocations of decide() by qi, in both
cases, more than n+t2 different simulators have broadcast a VIEW’WITNESS(y,−) message (line B48). Both
sets include correct simulators. They must then have received VALUE’ACK(z, v1) and VALUE’ACK(z, v2)
from more than n+t2 different simulators (line B38). Again, both sets include correct simulators that must
have received VALUE’WITNESS(z, v1) and VALUE’WITNESS(z, v2) from more than n+t2 different simulators
(line B21).
In order to broadcast a VALUE’WITNESS(z,−) message, a correct simulator must either (a) receive
VALUE’WITNESS(z,−) messages from at least t+1 different simulators (line B18), or (b) receive VALUE’VALID(z,−)
messages from more than n+t2 different simulators (line B16). The first correct simulator that broadcasts a
VALUE’WITNESS(z,−) message must then have received VALUE’VALID(z,−) messages from more than n+t2
different simulators.
According to Lemma 10, there is a least one correct simulator q` that broadcasts both VALUE’VALID(z,−)
messages (line B15). In order to do so, the predicate valid`(z, v2) must have been verified at the time that
q` broadcast the VALUE’VALID(z, v2) message. It must then have received the VIEW’WITNESS(z, view)
messages that correspond to v1 from more than n+t2 different simulators. According to Theorem 3, qi
must then also have received these messages from more than n+t2 different simulators and assigned view
to all_viewsi[z] (line B48) in the instance that corresponds to the invocation of propose(v1) by qz , a contra-
diction that concludes the proof of the lemma. 2Lemma 14
Agreement
Lemma 15. For any simulator qx and any correct simulator qi, if qi assigns a non-⊥ value v to valuesi[x],
then (1) no value v′ 6= v is ever assigned to valuesj [x] by a correct simulator qj and (2) each such correct
simulator qj eventually assigns v to valuesj [x].
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Proof Let qk be the first simulator that assigns v to valuesk[x]. Since qk executes line B22, it received
strictly more than n+t2 VALUE’WITNESS (x, v) messages from different simulators. At least t + 1 correct
simulators consequently sent this message to all processes at line B17 or at line B19. By Theorem 3, every
correct simulator qj consequently eventually receives such a message from each correct simulator and assigns
v to valuesj [x].
Suppose that there exists a value v′ 6= v such that there is a correct simulator q` that assigns v′ to
values`[x]. Suppose that q` is the first process to do so. It follows that q` received VALUE’WITNESS (x, v′)
messages from strictly more than n+t2 different processes (line B21 or line B24).
Consider the first correct simulator that broadcasts a VALUE’WITNESS (x, v′) message. In order to do
so, it must have received VALUE’VALID (x, v′) messages from strictly more than n+t2 different processes
(lines B16-B17). However, the first correct simulator that broadcasts a VALUE’WITNESS (x, v) message must
also have received VALUE’VALID (x, v) messages from strictly more than n+t2 different processes. There
must then be a correct simulator that sent both VALUE’VALID (x,−) messages. The only place a correct
simulator can send a VALUE’VALID (x,−) message is at Line 15 and it does so only once for each simulator
qx, a contradiction which concludes the proof of the lemma. 2Lemma 15
Lemma 16. For any simulators qk, q`, qx and any correct simulator qi, if qi assigns a non-⊥ value v to
answersi[`][k][x], then (1) no value v′ 6= v is ever assigned to answersj [`][k][x] by a correct simulator qj
and (2) each such correct simulator qj eventually assigns v to answersj [`][k][x].
Proof The proof is the same as for Lemma 15. 2Lemma 16
Lemma 17. For any simulator qx and any correct simulator qi, if qi assigns a non-⊥ value view to all_viewsi[x],
then (1) no value view′ 6= view is ever assigned to all_viewsj [x] by a correct simulator qj and (2) each such
correct simulator qj eventually assigns view to all_viewsj [x].
Proof The proof is the same as for Lemma 15. 2Lemma 17
Lemma 18. No two invocations of decide() return different values.
Proof Let us recall that the algorithm implementing the operation decide() is described at lines C15-C19. Let
qi and qj be two correct simulators. According to Lemmas 15-17, we have:
• (valuesi[x] 6= ⊥) ∧ (valuesj [x] 6= ⊥) ⇒ (valuesi[x] = valuesj [x]).
• (answersi[`][k][x] 6=? ∧ answersj [`][k][x] 6=?)⇒ (answersi[`][k][x] = answersj [`][k][x]).
• (all_viewsi[x] 6= ⊥ ∧ all_viewj [x] 6= ⊥) ⇒ (all_viewsi[x] = all_viewj [x]).
Let us assume, by contradiction, that qi and qj decide different values. This means that the sets min_σi
and min_σj computed at line C17 by qi and qj , respectively, are different.
Since min_σi and min_σj are different, let us consider z ∈ min_σi \min_σj (if min_σi ( min_σj ,
swap i and j). According to the closure predicate used at line C16, as z /∈ min_σj , we have ∀y ∈
min_σj : all_viewsj [y][z] = ⊥.
It follows that qj received VIEW’WITNESS (y, all_viewj [y]) messages (with all_viewj [y][z] = ⊥) from
a set of simulators Qj,vw of size strictly larger than n+t2 (the subscript vw stands for “view witness”). The
correct simulators of Qj,vw sent these messages after checking at line B39 that a set Qj,vw,r of strictly more
than n+t2 reliably broadcast (thanks to the mechanism of lines B26 to B33) a READ’ANSWER (y, z,⊥) mes-
sage. The correct simulators ofQj,vw,r sent these messages at line B26 after they received VALUE’ACK (y, vy)
messages from a set Qy,w of strictly more than n+t2 simulators (the subscript w stands for “witness”). Each
correct simulator qk of Qy,w had valuesk[y] = vy when it sent this message and it happens strictly before the
first correct simulator sends a READ’ANSWER (y, z,⊥) message.
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Since z ∈ min_σi, the correct simulator qi received VIEW’WITNESS (z, all_viewi[z]) messages from a
set Qi,vw of strictly more than n+t2 simulators. The correct simulators of Qi,vw sent these messages after the
check of the values at lines B38-B39.
Suppose that some of them verified the predicate of line B39 for x = y. It entails that a set Qi,vw,r of
strictly more than n+t2 simulators reliably broadcast a READ’ANSWER (z, y,⊥). The correct simulators of
Qi,vw,r sent this message after receiving at line B24 VALUE’ACK (z, vz) messages from a set Qz,w of strictly
more than n+t2 simulators. This happens strictly before the first READ’ANSWER (z, y,⊥) message is sent by a
correct simulator. Since |Qi,vw,r|, |Qj,vw,r| > n+t2 , Qi,vw,r ∩Qj,vw,r contains at least a correct simulator pk.
Simulator pk thus broadcast a READ’ANSWER (y, z,⊥) message and a READ’ANSWER (z, y,⊥) mes-
sage (line B26). It then had viewsk[z] = ⊥ before broadcasting the READ’ANSWER (y, z,⊥) message
and viewsk[y] = ⊥ before broadcasting the READ’ANSWER (z, y,⊥). Because of the first instruction of
line B25 this is impossible, and thus each correct process that sends a VIEW’WITNESS (z, all_viewsi[z])
message ended the wait instruction of lines B38-B39 by verifying the predicate of line B38. This entails that
∀x ∈ Π : all_viewsx[z] 6= ⊥ ⇒ all_viewsx[z][y] 6= ⊥. Consequently, all_viewsi[z][y] 6= ⊥.
Since z ∈ min_σi, all_viewsi[z] 6= ⊥ and thus all_viewsi[z][y] 6= ⊥. According to the predicate of
line C16, this entails that y ∈ min_σi, and since the previous reasoning holds for any y ∈ min_σj , it shows
that min_σj ⊆ min_σi. It follows that, when qi executes line C17, ∀y ∈ min_σj : all_viewsi[y] 6= ⊥ and,
consequently, ∀y ∈ min_σj : all_viewsi[y] = all_viewsj [y]. It entails that if |min_σj | < |min_σi|, then
min_σj would have been chosen by qi at line C17, which proves that min_σi = min_σj and contradicts the
fact that qi and qj decide differently. 2Lemma 18
Correct values are valid
Lemma 19. If a correct simulator qi decides the value v, there is a correct simulator qj such that validj(−, v).
Proof
Let v be the value decided by a correct simulator qi. Value v has then be proposed by a simulator qj
such that all_viewsi[j] 6= ⊥ (definition of σ at lines 15-C16 and choice of value at line C18). In order to
assign a non-⊥ value to all_viewsi[j], qi must have received VIEW’WITNESS(j,−) messages from more than
n+t
2 different simulators (lines B47-B48), and consequently from at least one correct simulator. Consider the
first correct simulator qx that has broadcast a VIEW’WITNESS(j,−) message. Before sending it, it must have
assigned a non-⊥ value to valuesx[j] (lines B35-B42). It then has received either (a) VALUE’WITNESS(j,−)
messages from more than n+t2 different simulators or (b) VALUE’ACK(j,−) messages from more than n+t2
different simulators.
In case (a), consider the first correct simulator qk that has broadcast a VALUE’WITNESS(j,−) message. In
order to do so, it must have received VALUE’VALID(j,−) messages from more than n+t2 different simulators
(lines B16-17). The predicate validk(j, v) must have been satisfied at the simulators that broadcast these
messages(line B15). In case (b), the first correct simulator that has broadcast a VALUE’ACK(j,−) message
must first have received VALUE’WITNESS(j,−) messages from more than n+t2 different simulators (lines
B21-B23). The situation is then similar to Case (a). 2Lemma 19
Theorem 4. The algorithms described in Figure 3 and Figure 4 implement a safe-agreement object in
BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
Proof The proof follows from the previous lemmas. 2Theorem 4
5.6 Simulation algorithm and its proof in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]
Simulation algorithm When we consider the simulation algorithm described in Figure 2, we observe that
the n simulators communicate only through safe agreement objects. It follows that the same algorithm works
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in BAMPn,t[t < n/3], when the crash-tolerant safe agreement objects are replaced by Byzantine-tolerant
safe agreement objects previously described. Two things remain to be done: define the specific sub-predicate
P2 of the predicate valid(), and do a specific proof of this algorithm (i.e., a proof based on the specification
of the Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects defined in Section 5.2).
Sub-predicate P2 As far as P2 is concerned we have the following. Let us consider the simulator qi
that invokes validi(j, v), with respect to the simulation of a process px. In the simulation algorithm, the
parameter v is the message msg that qj proposes to a safe agreement object from which will be decided the
next message to be received by the simulated process px (lines 08-09 of Figure 2). P2 checks, from qi’s local
point of view, that, if the message v has been sent in the simulation, then it has not yet been consumed, i.e.,
(v ∈ senti[x]) ⇒ (v /∈ receivedi[x]).
Proof of the simulation algorithm in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]
Lemma 20. The simulation of at most t simulated processes can be blocked.
Proof The only places where a correct simulator qi can block is during the invocation of the safe agreement
operation decide(). Such invocations appear at line 02, and line 11.
Because the invocations by all the correct simulators of decide() on all the safe agreement objects termi-
nate, except for at most t safe agreement objects (Lemma 14), the simulation of at most t simulated processes
can be blocked. 2Lemma 20
Lemma 21. The simulation of the reception of the k-th message received by a simulated process pj , returns
the same message at all correct simulators.
Proof The simulation of the message receptions for a simulated process pj , are executed at each correct sim-
ulator qi at lines 08-11, and all the correct simulators use the same sequence of sequence numbers (line 07).
It then follows from the agreement property of the safe agreement object SA[j, sn], that no two correct simu-
lators obtain different messages when they invoke SA[j, sn].decide(), and the lemma follows. 2Lemma 21
Lemma 22. For every simulated processes pj , no two correct simulators return different values.
Proof The only non-deterministic elements of the simulation are the input vectors inputi[1..n′] at each
simulator qi, and the reception of the simulated messages.
The lines 01-02 of the simulation force the correct simulators to agree on the same input value for each
simulated process pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n′. Similarly, as shown by Lemma 21, for each simulated process pj , the
lines 07-11 direct the simulators to agree on the very same sequence of messages received by pj . It follows
from the fact that the function δj() is deterministic, that any two correct simulators qi and qk, that execute
lines 15-16 during the same “round number” sni[j] = snk[j], are such that statei[j] = statek[j], from which
the lemma follows. 2Lemma 22
Lemma 23. The sequences of message receptions simulated by each simulator qi on behalf of each simulated
process pj , define a correct execution of the simulated algorithm.
Proof To prove the correctness of the simulation, we have to show that
1. Every message that was received by a simulated process was sent by another simulated process,
2. Every message that was sent by a simulated process to another simulated process (whose simulation is
not blocked either), is received, and
3. The simulated messages respect a simulated physical order (i.e., no message is “received” before being
“sent”).
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Item 1 follows from Lemma 19 and from the definition of P2. Item 2 is satisfied because the messages
sent by the simulated process pj to the simulated process pk are received (lines 09-11) in their sending order
(as defined at line 04 and line 14). Hence, if pk is not blocked (due to a faulty simulator) it obtains the
messages from pj in their sending order.
For Item 3, let us define a (simulated) physical order as follows. For each simulated message m, let us
consider the first time at which the reception of m was simulated (i.e., this occurs when –for the first time–
a simulator terminates the invocation of SA[−,−].decide() that returns m). A message that is decided has
been proposed by a simulator to a safe agreement object before being decided (validity property).The sending
time of a simulated message is then the first time at which SA[−,−].propose(m) is invoked by a simulator.
It follows that any simulated message is sent before being received, which concludes the lemma. 2Lemma 23
Lemma 24. Each correct simulator qi computes the decision value of at least (n′ − t) simulated processes.
Proof Due to Lemma 20, and the fact that at most t simulators may be byzantine, it follows that at most t
simulated processes may be prevented from progressing. As (a) by assumption the simulated algorithm A′ is
t-resilient, and (b) due to Lemma 23 the simulation produces a correct simulation of A′, it follows that at least
(n′ − t) simulated processes decide a value. 2Lemma 24
Theorem 5. Let A be an algorithm solving a decision task in CAMPn′,t[t < n′]. The algorithm de-
scribed in Figure 2, in which Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects are used, is a correct simulation
of A in BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
Proof The theorem follows from Lemma 23 and Lemma 24. 2Theorem 5
Additionally, the reader can easily check that the simulation of a message only requires a polynomial
number of messages in the base system, and the increase in size of these messages, when compared to the size
of the simulated message, is also polynomial.
6 Implications of the Simulation
BG-simulation in Byzantine message-passing systems A main result of this paper is a signature-free
distributed algorithm that solves BG-simulation in Byzantine asynchronous message-passing systems. In
addition to being the first algorithm that solves BG-simulation in such a severe failure context, the proposed
simulation algorithm has noteworthy applications as shown below.
From Byzantine-failures to crash failures in message-passing systems The simulation presented here
allows the execution of a t-resilient crash-tolerant algorithm in an asynchronous message-passing system
where up to t processes may be Byzantine. A feature that is sometimes required from a Byzantine-tolerant
algorithm solving a task (not usually considered in the crash failure case) is that the value decided by any
correct process should be based only on inputs of correct processes. This prevents Byzantine processes from
“polluting” the computation with their inputs. A way to guarantee that an input has been proposed by a correct
process is to check that it has been proposed by at least (t + 1) different processes. Assuming that in any
execution at most m values are proposed, this constraint translates as n− t > mt [16, 28].
In the case of the simulation presented in Section 5, this requirement can easily be satisfied by adding
a first step of computation before the start of the simulation. Simulators first broadcast their input. They
then echo every value that they receive from more than t + 1 different simulators, and consider these values
(and only these values) as valid inputs. An input considered valid by a correct simulator is then eventually
considered valid by all correct simulators, and the only inputs allowed in the simulation are inputs of correct
simulators. Because we consider colorless tasks, the choice of output is done in the same way as in the original
BG-simulation: a simulator can adopt the output of any simulated process that has decided a value.
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The possible Byzantine behaviors are restrained by the underlying Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement
objects used in the simulation. Surprisingly, this shows that, from the point of view of the computability
of colorless tasks and assuming n > (m + 1)t (this requirement always implies n > 3t when at least two
different values can be proposed), Byzantine failures are equivalent to crash-failures. This provides us with
a new understanding of Byzantine failures and shows that their impact can be restricted to the much simpler
crash-failure case.
From wait-free shared memory to message-passing The proposed simulation can be combined with pre-
vious works to further extend the scope of the result. Consider an algorithm A0 that solves a colorless task,
where m > 1, in a wait-free read/write memory system of t + 1 processes, denoted CARWt+1,t[∅]. Us-
ing the basic BG-simulation [6], this algorithm can be transformed into an algorithm A1 that works in the
t-resilient read/write memory system of (m+ 1)t+ 1 processes, in which at most t can crash. This model is
denoted CARW(m+1)t+1,t[∅]. Using an implementation of a read/write memory in a crash-prone message-
passing system in which a majority of processes are correct [2], we obtain an algorithm A2 which work in
CAMP(m+1)t+1,t[∅] (message-passing system system of (m + 1)t + 1 processes, in which at most t can
crash; notice that m > 0 ⇒ (m + 1)t + 1 > 2t)). Finally, using the simulation presented in this paper,
we obtain Byzantine-tolerant algorithmA3 which works in BAMP(m+1)t+1,t[∅] (message-passing system of
(m+ 1)t+ 1 processes, of which at most t can be Byzantine; notice that m > 1⇒ (m+ 1)t+ 1 > 3t).
These transformations show that, as far as the computability of colorless tasks that admit up to m > 1
different input values is concerned, an n-process Byzantine-prone message-passing system, in which up to t <
n/(m+ 1) processes can be Byzantine, is equivalent to a wait-free shared memory system of t+ 1 processes,
which at most commit crash failures. When considering colorless tasks with m > 1, a figure relating these
transformations is depicted in Figure 6. Differently from the full-information algorithm presented in [28],
the simulation presented in the present paper (along with [6] and [2]) allows a direct transformation of any
wait-free shared-memory algorithm that solves a colorless task into a message-passing Byzantine-tolerant
algorithm.
A0 in CARW t+1,t[∅]
A1 in CARW (m+1)t+1,t[∅]
BG simulation [6]
ABD simulation [2]
This paper
A2 in CAMP (m+1)t+1,t[∅]
A3 in BAMP (m+1)t+1,t[∅]
Figure 6: From crash in read/write to Byzantine in message-passing (with m > 1)
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